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Abstract
During the first decade of the twentieth century, the Uruguayan labor market showed
a significant decline in wage inequality and in the incidence of labor informality, while
similar changes also took place in other Latin American countries. These trends were
observed in a period of strong economic dynamism. Most extended explanations
for this declining inequality in the region have been centered on falling returns to
education. The main goal of this paper is to present new evidence on the relation
between informality and wage inequality through a RIF-based regression decomposition
analysis which, besides confirming the relevant role of education, shows that the process
of labor market formalization also played a significant role in the reduction of inequality
in Uruguay, mainly through a price effect.
JEL Classification: D31, J31
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1 Introduction
A significant reduction in informality—measured as the share of workers who do not
contribute to the social security system—was probably one of the main changes in the
Uruguayan labor market during the last decade. In 2001, 36 % of workers did not contrib-
ute to social security even though this contribution was mandatory for everyone. This
share increased in the following years, reaching 41 % in 2004. The trend then reversed in
2005, and after many years of decline, informality fell to 24 % in 2013. The overall decline
in informality is mainly explained by the behavior of private employees, whose informality
rate went from 28 % in 2001 to 13 % in 2013 (Table 4 in the Appendix). This significant
decline in informality is probably related both to the sustained cycle of economic growth
that the Uruguayan economy experienced during the period and to a set of relevant insti-
tutional changes that took place simultaneously.
On the wage side, a significant decline took place during the recession and economic
crisis that the country faced at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Its recovery
was slower than that of economic activity: wages began to grow in 2005 and only got
back to their pre-crash level in 2010. This average evolution was the result of different
changes along the wage distribution, which led to a strong decline in all wage inequality
indices after 2006 (Table 5 in the Appendix). Up to now, the link between informality
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and inequality had not been systematically studied. Thus, the main purpose of this paper
is to underline the importance of this relation and the potential role of informality, given
that the existing literature on wage inequality has focused on other characteristics of wage
setting, such as the impacts of human capital or regional disparities.
Previous research indicates that the main explanatory factor for this decline of in-
equality has been the narrowing of the wage gap by educational level, as it happened in
other countries in the region. The increase in employment and the decline in regional
inequalities have also played a role in inequality decline, although a somewhat smaller
one (see Amarante et al. 2014; Alves et al. 2012; Llambí and Perera 2014; among
others). The change in educational attainment has had a minor contribution, which
highlights a major weakness that the country faces. The literature has paid less attention
to institutional features of the labor market, although the increase in the minimum wage
has been mentioned as an element that may have contributed to labor income equality
(see for example, ECLAC 2014).
These two main features that arise from the description of the Uruguayan labor
market took place with slightly different schedules: while informality began to decline
in 2004, wage inequality continued to rise until 2007, before starting to decline
(Fig. 1). Nevertheless, both phenomena may be related, and the objective of this article
is to explore this potential link.
Theoretically, the fall in informality could be related to wage inequality in different
ways, depending on the magnitude of the change, the relative weight of the formal and
informal sectors, the level of inequality within each sector, and the income differential
between sectors. Disentangling the nature of this link is not easy, especially in a context
like the Uruguayan one during the years we studied, which were marked by significant
economic growth and simultaneous changes at the institutional, political, and economic
levels. In such a context, informality cannot be claimed to be exogenous, and its effect
should be interpreted as reflecting that of labor market institutions. In spite of this, we
argue that we can shed light on this link by applying microeconometric decompositions
to describe the main features of wage inequality changes, and by including formality
among the explanatory factors. Based on the methodology proposed by Firpo et al.
(2011), we compute the differential effects of various variables across the wage distribu-
tion and isolate the contribution of each variable. The article is organized as follows.
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Fig. 1 Evolution of labor informality and inequality. 2001–2013. Source: based on household surveys
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After that, we summarize recent policies that may have directly or indirectly affected
informality evolution in Uruguay, and summarize the main factors that the literature
has identified as potential explanations for inequality decline (Section 3). We then de-
scribe our methodology (Section 4) and present our main results (Section 5). Finally,
we present our conclusions (Section 6).
2 Motivation: informality and inequality
Most developing economies are characterized, among other things, by sizeable informal
employment (see for example Schneider 2012; Tornarolli et al. 2014; among others).
In many of these countries, the level of income inequality is also substantial and
mainly determined by high labor income inequality. Despite these two clear features,
the literature addressing the informality-inequality relationship is relatively scarce,
probably due to the substantial problems related to endogeneity and omitted vari-
ables, as discussed below.
Indeed, one may argue that inequality contributes to informality, but it could also be
the case that informality leads to inequality—reverse causation. For instance, the model
proposed by Chong and Gradstein (2007) is consistent with the first explanation. They
show that increases in income inequality—induced by decreases in the relative returns
to formality for the poor—lead to a greater informal sector and that this effect is higher
when institutions are weak. Similarly, Mishra and Ray (2013) argue that an increase in
income inequality fosters demand for informal sector goods, thus providing support for
a positive inequality-informality relationship for developing countries. A related strand
of the literature emphasizes the link between high informality and lower tax revenue
(Loayza 1996; Johnson et al. 1998; Shneider and Enste 2000; among others). This, in
turn, can affect the State’s ability to redistribute both directly and indirectly through
education, which can have a direct impact on inequality. This type of argument has
been incorporated by Rosser et al. (2000, 2003) for example, who also find a positive
correlation between informality and the Gini coefficient in transition economies, and
explicitly recognize that different causal mechanisms may operate in both directions.
Binelli and Atanassio (2010), using microdata for Mexico, show that wage inequality
is much higher among informal workers and that changes in the size of the informal
sector closely follow changes in wage inequality. In a later paper, Binelli
(2016)—based on Mexican evidence—suggests that higher wage dispersion is one of
the channels through which informality negatively affects development. Therefore,
despite the presence of methodological difficulties in identifying casual links and the
scarce literature about this topic, there is some evidence of a positive correlation
between inequality and informality.
Problems related to omitted variables are also very relevant when trying to model the link
between inequality and informality. Diverse social and economic interventions can influ-
ence both inequality and informality. This may be especially important in the Uruguayan
case, as many changes in social and economic policies were in place simultaneously and
may have affected both inequality and informality, as discussed in the next section.
3 Policies and their role in the process of formalization
The first relevant aspect to highlight is the macroeconomic context in which the
formalization process took place. Uruguay was marked by economic growth during
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the last decade, with an average GDP growth of 5.7 % between 2004 and 2013. While
it is not necessarily the case that economic growth leads to a decrease in informality,
as seen with the Uruguayan experience of the 1990s, it is important to recognize
that economic growth and stability provide very favorable conditions for its reduc-
tion. In a context of economic stability, the risks of layoffs—and their associated
costs in the case of formal workers—are lower, which can give employers an incen-
tive to favor formality. Also, lower unemployment rates can increase workers’
bargaining power and their chances of being formalized. Finally, the increase in
demand for goods and services in periods of economic growth benefits the self-
employed and may increase earnings, which can contribute to covering the costs of
formalization. All of these factors may have played a role in the recent evolution of
informality in Uruguay, confirming the existing evidence on the pro-cyclical behavior
of formal employment.
Another relevant aspect in the recent Uruguayan experience is the significant set of
reforms and new policies that were implemented. They include the reinstatement of
collective bargaining in 2005, the significant increase in minimum wages from December
2004, the tax reform implemented in 2007, the creation of the National Health System
in 2008, and the inception of conditional cash transfers for families with children in
2006. In some cases, these policies may have had an impact on formalization, changing
the incentives of firms and workers to operate in the formal or informal sector. In other
cases, they may have influenced the wage differential between formal and informal sec-
tors. Unfortunately, there are no evaluations to assess the impact of most of these pol-
icies on informality. Nevertheless, we cannot pretend that formalization came as an
entirely exogenous change. As stated before, it may have been endogenous to economic
growth or associated to changes in the institutional rules that drive the formal labor
market. The main legal and institutional changes that affected the labor market are
summarized in the Appendix.
4 Methodology and data
In this paper, we rely on the microeconometric decompositions proposed by Firpo et
al. (2011) in order to compute the differential effects of several variables across the
wage distribution and to disentangle the contribution of each variable. This method
allows us to decompose the total change of a distributional statistic into a composition
or characteristic effect, which captures the impact of the variations in the distribution
of covariates (X), and a wage structure or return effect, which reflects how the condi-
tional distribution of wage (F(w/x)) changes in that period.
The first step consists in the estimation of recentered influence function regressions
(RIF regressions), proposed by Firpo et al. (2007). These functions allow us to approxi-
mate non-linear functionals of the distribution, as a way to extend the traditional
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of mean earnings to other features of the distribution.
In this way, RIF regressions permit the decomposition of changes in wages at each
quantile of the distribution separating the component attributable to a composition or
to a price effect for each explanatory variable.
The influence function (IF) is used to build measures of robustness of a statistical
ν(F) in the presence of outliers. Therefore, the IF is a function that captures the influ-
ence of an observation on ν(F). Its generic expression is given by:
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F Y ; v; Fð Þ ¼ lim
→0
vðF Þ−v Fð Þ
v FÞð
 
where F ¼ 1−ÞF þ δy; with 0 ≤  ≤1

ð1Þ
The parameter δy represents a distribution that only puts mass in the value y of the Y
distribution. An important property of IF is
Z ∞
−∞
IF y; vð ÞdF yð Þ ¼ 0. The recentered influ-




RIF y; vð ÞdF yð Þ ¼ v Fð Þ ð2Þ
The instrumentation of a microeconometric decomposition based on RIF regression
requires to compute two counterfactual statisticals:
vCt ¼ hvcg¼tþn ¼ E RIF yt ; vð Þ=X; g ¼ t þ n½  ð3Þ
vCtþn ¼ hvcg¼t ¼ E RIF ytþn; v
 
=X; g ¼ t  ð4Þ
The functions h may be non-linear. However, it is possible to generate a first-order
local approximation based on linear regressions. From the model hlinealg ¼ xTγg , we can
obtain the parameters γ ̂t ; γ
̂




. The parameters γ ̂t and γ
̂
tþn arise from the
regression for each year. The counterfactual vector γ ̂C;t comes from a regression in year
t, reweighted to match the X distribution at t + n. Lastly, γ ̂C;tþn is computed by estimat-
ing a regression with the observations belonging to t + n but using weights that corres-
pond to the X distribution at t.
Hence, the aggregate decomposition can be expressed as:
Δvs ¼ vtþn−vCt ¼ E X=g ¼ t þ n½ T γ ̂tþn−γ ̂C;t
 	
ð5Þ
ΔvX ¼ vCt −vt ¼ E X=g ¼ t þ n½ Tγ ̂C;t−E X=g ¼ t½ Tγ ̂t ð6Þ
ΔvO ¼ ΔvX þ ΔvS ð7Þ
where Δvs and Δ
v
X are the wage structure effect and the composition effect, respectively.
If the function h is non-linear, then γ ̂t and γ
̂
C;t are not equal. In this case, the com-
position effect includes an error term Rv:
ΔvX ¼ vCt −vt ¼ E X=g ¼ t þ n½ T−E X=g ¼ t½ T
 	
γ ̂t þ Rv ð8Þ
with Rv ¼ E X=g ¼ t þ n½ T γ ̂tC−γ ̂tÞ

Rv is the lineal projection error. Its magnitude is a way to evaluate the goodness
of fit of the linear approximation obtained through the RIF regressions (Firpo et
al. 2007).
Finally, the detailed decomposition is computed as the contribution of each variable
to the wage structure and composition effect, which allows us to isolate the specific
effect of each variable:




E Xk=g ¼ t þ n½ T−E Xk=g ¼ t½ T
 	




E Xk=g ¼ t þ n½ Tγ ̂k;C;t−E Xk=g ¼ t½ Tγ ̂k;t ð10Þ
Our estimations are based on data from the Uruguayan household survey for the period
2001–2013.1 Informality, measured as the percentage of workers who do not make contri-
butions to the social security system, is included as an explanatory variable. Other explana-
tory variables include sex, educational levels (five groups), age (three groups), marital
status, geographical region, a binary variable for public employees, and controls for indus-
try. The regressions and decomposition exercises detailed in the next section were
conducted among employees from the private and public sectors aged 18 to 60. We re-
strict our analysis to people aged 18 and above to obtain a sample with a more stable labor
market participation, and only included people under 60 because this represents retire-
ment age. This universe of salaried workers represents almost 75 % of total employment.
5 Results
The presentation of our main results is organized into three parts. First, we present a
counterfactual wage density decomposition as an illustration of the role of formality in
distributional changes. Second, based on RIF regressions, we discuss aggregate decom-
position of changes in inequality indicators, to evaluate the role of price and character-
istic effects. Finally, we present results from detailed decompositions to illustrate the
contribution of each variable within these effects. Given the dynamics of the Uruguayan
labor market, the 2001–2013 period is disaggregated into two sub-periods: 2001–2006
and 2006–2013. In the first sub-period, characterized by the economic crisis and subse-
quent recovery, we observe a fall in real wages without major changes in the level of in-
equality, or even with a slight upward trend. The latter period of economic expansion
occurs in a context of significant institutional and regulatory change, a strong process
of formalization, and a fall in the level of wage inequality.
5.1 Counterfactual density function
Following the semi-parametric methodology proposed by DiNardo et al. (1996), we es-
timate the wage density in 2013 assuming that the degree of formalization is that pre-
vailing in 2001, whereas other characteristics of employees remain unchanged. The
difference between the counterfactual and actual density functions in 2013 reflects the
variation in the distribution which can be attributed to the process of formalization. By
comparing the counterfactual density and the actual density in 2013, we can see a shift
in the lower part of the distribution to a little above the average that can be attributed
to a formalization effect (Fig. 2). The biggest change is seen between the 10th and 50th
percentiles, while the variations are smaller in the upper parts of the distribution.
These results are summarized in Table 1. Approximately 26 % of the total decline in
the Gini index (equivalent to one and a half points in the index) is related to changes
in labor formalization. The effect is much more pronounced on the ratio between the
50th and 10th percentiles (p50/p10). In this case, formalization explains 125 % of the
variation in labor inequality.
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These results provide a first hint about the potential equalizing role of formalization,
the decomposition of changes in inequality presented below help to deepen our un-
derstanding of the underlying processes.
5.2 RIF regressions and aggregate decomposition
Results from RIF-based regressions show that the formality premium at the median
of the distribution increases between 2001 and 2007, and then starts to decline until
it reaches a minimum in 2013.2 Additionally, the marginal effect of formalization
decreases across the distribution and nearly becomes null at the top of it in all
years. Returns to secondary and post-secondary education increase between 2001
and 2006, and then began to diminish. The gender gap is relatively stable across the
period—changes are not statistically significant; the regional gap—favorable to
Montevideo, the capital of the country—declines significantly at the median of the




































































































































Fig. 2 a, b Impact of formalization on wage density, 2001–2013. Source: own estimations based on
household surveys
Table 1 Effect of formalization on hourly wages. Dinardo et al. (1996) decomposition
Statistic 2001 2013 2013 (2001 formality) Total change Formality effect % formality in total effect
90–10 1.798 1.538 1.684 −0.259 −0.145 56 %
90–50 0.937 0.769 0.799 −0.167 −0.030 18 %
50–10 0.861 0.769 0.884 −0.092 −0.115 125 %
Gini 0.410 0.351 0.366 −0.059 −0.015 26 %
Source: own estimations based on household surveys
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A more detailed analysis by income percentile shows that wages grow along the
entire distribution between 2001 and 2013, with a clear equalizing pattern: the rate of
variation falls across the distribution (Fig. 3a). This differential evolution along the
distribution is linked to a price effect, as the composition effect indicates a positive
variation in remuneration which is relatively homogenous across the distribution. There
are important differences across sub-periods. Between 2001 and 2006, the composition
effect has a positive impact on wages, but the variation is dominated by a price effect,
which leads to an overall decline in the level of wages—which is smaller in the upper
part of the distribution (Fig. 3b). The combined effect is negative across the entire
distribution and is also associated with a slight increase in inequality. Between 2006
and 2013, wage increases benefit those at the bottom of the income distribution, while
the positive impact of the composition effect on wages is relatively homogenous across
the distribution. Equalizing changes in the distribution are dominated by a price effect
in this second sub-period (Fig. 3c).
The decomposition of the main inequality indicators confirms these results. The
decrease in the Gini index during the whole period is dominated by the price effect
(Table 2). The price—or returns—effect is the main driving factor in the upper part of
the distribution (90–50), while the composition effect accounts for a larger share of the
gap between the median and the lower tail of the distribution. Again, differential
patterns are detected in both sub-periods. The slight increase in the Gini coefficient
between 2001 and 2006 is the result of both a price and a composition effect, with
relatively similar incidences along the distribution. The significant decrease in the Gini
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Fig. 3 a–c Aggregate decomposition of changes in hourly wages. 2001–2013. Source: own estimations
based on household surveys
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Table 2 Decomposition of the main indicators of inequality
2001–2013 2001–2006 2006–2013
90–10 90–50 50–10 Gini 90–10 90–50 50–10 Gini 90–10 90–50 50–10 Gini
Total change −0.258 −0.167 −0.091 −0.059 0.058 0.029 0.029 0.01 −0.317 −0.196 −0.121 −0.069
[0.0205] [0.0145] [0.0147] [0.00118]*** [0.0214] [0.0148] [0.0164] [0.00131]*** [0.0116] [0.0082] [0.0085] [0.00103]***
Returns −0.129 −0.157 0.028 −0.062 0.051 0.017 0.034 0.007 −0.19 −0.174 −0.016 −0.063
[0.0231] [0.0143] [0.0181] [0.000336]*** [0.0207] [0.0141] [0.0162] [0.000213]*** [0.0122] [0.0079] [0.0096] [0.000222]***
Composition −0.007 0.031 −0.038 −0.01 0.028 0.017 0.011 0.006 −0.084 −0.006 −0.078 −0.013
[0.0135] [0.0096] [0.0091] [0.00114]*** [0.0073] [0.0058] [0.0040] [0.00133]*** [0.0064] [0.0037] [0.0047] [0.000985]***
Interaction −0.122 −0.041 −0.081 0.013 −0.022 −0.006 −0.016 −0.002 −0.043 −0.016 −0.026 0.007
[0.0158] [0.0095] [0.0134] [0.000622]*** [0.0060] [0.0042] [0.0043] [0.000255]*** [0.0070] [0.0034] [0.0062] [0.000303]***
Total 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 %
Returns 50 % 94 % −31 % 105 % 88 % 59 % 117 % 70 % 60 % 89 % 13 % 91 %
Composition 3 % −19 % 42 % 17 % 48 % 59 % 38 % 60 % 26 % 3 % 64 % 19 %
Interaction 47 % 25 % 89 % −22 % −38 % −21 % −55 % −20 % 14 % 8 % 21 % −10 %
Source: own estimations based on household surveys

















different patterns are evident across the distribution. The composition effect prevails in
the lower part of the distribution, whereas the price effect explains most of the decline
in inequality between the median and the 90th percentile. A detailed decomposition
is needed in order to understand what factors are behind these aggregate price and
composition effects.
5.3 Detailed decomposition
In order to illustrate the main results of the detailed decomposition, the relative im-
portance of each factor along the percentiles of the distribution is presented in Figs. 4
and 5 (composition and return effects, respectively). Given the importance of education
and informality, these factors are presented in a separate figure. For the whole period,
the relative low relevance of the aggregate composition effect is explained by the op-
posite effect of the changes in educational attainment and the employment distribution
between the formal and informal sectors: whereas the first factor shows an increasing
curve, the second shows a decreasing pattern (Fig. 4). On the other hand, the returns
to education and the wage differential between the formal and informal sectors have a
clear equalizing effect (Fig. 5)
As a result, a first in-depth analysis of the composition effect reveals an interesting pat-
tern. The relative homogeneity and moderate magnitude of the composition effect dis-
cussed in the previous section are the result of the diverging impacts of formalization and
the evolution of workers’ educational levels (Fig. 4a), which tend to counterbalance.
Whereas the increase in the supply of educated workers has been inequality increasing,
the increase in the number of formal workers has acted in the opposite direction, pushing
for a decline in labor income inequality during the whole period. The other variables have
minor composition effects over the whole distribution of wages (see Fig. 4b).
As mentioned, both formality and education have reinforcing price effects, which lead
to an equalizing result (Fig. 5). Changes in formality premium mainly positively impact
the lower end of the distribution. As for returns to education, they also have a positive
effect on wages in the lower percentiles, although the magnitude is smaller than that of
formality prices, but the effect becomes negative above the median (see Fig. 5a). Two
additional variables exhibit a significant price or return effect: the gap between
Montevideo and the interior and wage differences by industry (see Fig. 5b). Both of
these factors partially compensate the equalizing price effects of education and formality.
The aggregate effect of industry is reflecting changes in wage differentials by activity
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Fig. 4 a, b Detailed composition effect. 2001–2013. Source: own estimations based on household surveys
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The analysis by sub-period indicates that, in the case of the composition effect,
there is a clear link between formalization and inequality dynamics between 2006
and 2013, while the increase in education levels exhibits a concentrating pattern in
both sub-periods. Notably, the effect of the wage premium on formality has a posi-
tive impact on inequality in both periods, and the same happened with returns to
education (Table 3).
One of the advantages of RIF regressions is that they allow us to calculate the uncon-
ditional marginal effect of an explanatory variable on wages along the distribution or
on different distributive statistics. Figure 6 shows the marginal impact of formalization
by percentile, indicating why the process of formalization, ceteris paribus, triggers a
reduction in wage inequality. For the 3 years considered, the marginal effect varies
negatively and monotonically with the percentile, becoming almost null in the upper









10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90
Formality Education









10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90
Age Marital status Region Gender Industry Public worker
Fig. 5 a, b Detailed price effect. 2001–2013. Source: own estimations based on household surveys
Table 3 Decomposition of the main inequality indicators. Role of formalization and education
90–10 90–50 50–10 Gini
2001–2013
Total change −0.137 −0.126 −0.011 −0.072
Formality −0.605 −0.073 −0.532 −0.054
Education −0.137 −0.056 −0.082 −0.035
Other 0.226 −0.034 0.260 0.007
Interaction 0.380 0.036 0.344 0.010
2001–2006
Total change 0.079 0.035 0.045 0.012
Formality −0.327 −0.067 −0.260 −0.015
Education −0.097 −0.035 −0.063 −0.010
Other 0.318 −0.051 0.369 0.013
Interaction 0.185 0.187 −0.002 0.024
2006–2013
Total change −0.274 −0.180 −0.094 −0.076
Formality −0.322 −0.013 −0.309 −0.037
Education −0.062 −0.039 −0.023 −0.018
Other −0.085 0.024 −0.108 −0.006
Interaction 0.194 −0.152 0.346 −0.015
Source: own estimations based on household surveys
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distribution, an increase in formalization unequivocally leads to a reduction in in-
equality: the income of all percentiles tends to increase, but the effect is larger at
lower percentiles. This result can be measured through the composition effect: if the
marginal effects are held constant relative to the base year, the change in the degree
of formalization reduces inequality.
The other relevant variable to understand the evolution of inequality is education.
Figure 7 shows the marginal effect of the binary variables used for each level of
education, the reference group being the least educated—less than 6 years of formal
education. As expected, the marginal effect for all educational groups increases
with the percentile, but this pattern becomes clearer for higher levels of education.












5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95
2001 2006 2013








5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95









5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95












5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95









5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95
7-11  years of education
2001 2006 2013
Fig. 7 Marginal effect by education category (reference group: 6 years or less of education). Source: own
estimations based on household surveys
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effect of education has a negative impact on inequality indices. An increase in the
participation of the most educated groups causes a non-uniform increase through-
out the wage distribution, and the absolute value of the change increases with the
percentile.
However, changes in the marginal effect patterns explain why the price effect of
education has a positive impact on inequality. The slope of the curves tapers off
between 2001 and 2013. Thus, the wage differences by education level alleviate the
impact on inequality during the period.
In sum, inequality decline is mainly driven by the overall progressive impact of the
price effect, which in turn is dominated by informality and education. The aggregate
composition effect is neutralized by the opposite effects of the increase in workers’
education level (unequalizing) and the increase in the number of formal workers
(equalizing).
The importance of the process of formalization in explaining the recent evolu-
tion of wage inequality is evident when jointly considering the composition and
return effects of these variables. The incidence of formalization on wage inequality
dynamics via both channels—changes in the wage premium and increase in the
number of formal workers—is summarized in Fig. 8, and compared with that of
education and other factors. The bars represent the sum of the price and compos-
ition effects of formality, education, and other factors. This aggregate impact is
very large below the 20th percentile in the case of formality and becomes lower
for the rest of the distribution. The overall change induced by formalization in
these first percentiles far exceeds the total observed variation, and other factors
acted to cushion the change induced by the increase in social security coverage
among employed workers.
Our main results are summarized in Table 3. The impact of formalization—both
trough prices and composition effect—accounts for a significant share of the total
change in inequality indices. This is particularly striking when it comes to indices rela-
tive to the 10th percentile—the 90–10 and 50–10 differentials—where the impact of
formality is higher and is more evident between 2006 and 2013.4











Formality-Composition effect Formality-Price effect 
Education-Composition effect Education-Price effect 
Other factors-Composition effect Other factors-Price effects 
Total Composition Effect Total Price Effect 
Fig. 8 Effect of formalization on the evolution of inequality. 2001–2013. Source: own estimations based on
household surveys
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Most of the changes in the synthetic indexes, like the Gini coefficient and the
ratios 90–10 and 90–50, are due to return effects, which in turn are dominated
by the incidence of formality and education, both with inequality-reducing effects
(see Table 3). Results are different for the ratio 50–10, an index which reflects
movements in the lower part of the distribution. Those movements are clearly
governed by the composition effect and specifically by the increase in the number
of formal workers in the lower part of the distribution, which had a significant
equalizing effect. The increase in the number of formal workers clearly favors the
lower percentiles of the distribution, while changes in educational attainment lead
to higher changes in remuneration in the upper segments.
Given the importance of the two aforementioned factors, it is necessary to con-
sider plausible hypotheses to explain these dynamics. Regarding the evolution of
returns to education, its decline has had a positive impact on inequality during
this period. Four possible factors may explain this decline: (1) the tax reform, (2)
the increase in minimum wages, (3) collective bargaining, and (4) the changes in
labor demand by education level, induced by the recent economic boom. The tax
reform reduced the wage gaps in terms of net income and this impact was rela-
tively linear: the net income of highly educated workers was reduced after the tax
reform, while that of low-educated workers increased. The introduction of mini-
mum wage and collective wage bargaining can also account for part of the in-
equality reduction; it had a positive impact on formal workers’ income, either by
affecting the minimum threshold—minimum wage—or by compressing the distri-
bution of wages by sector—collective bargaining. The potential role of changes in
the relative demand for qualified workers is less clear. There was a significant in-
crease in labor demand overall—with the lowest unemployment levels recorded
over the last four decades—but no systematic study has identified differential
variation in labor demand in Uruguay. The economic dynamism of sectors relying
intensively on unskilled labor—e.g., agriculture, mining—can partially account for
the reduction in returns to education, because of the increase in the relative de-
mand for unskilled workers, as suggested by the analysis of other countries in the
region (Gasparini et al. 2012). Moreover, the increase in the formality premium
in the first percentiles of the income distribution may also be related to both
minimum wages and wage bargaining, although this remains an open research
question.5 In any case, our results indicate that changes in the institutional char-
acteristics that regulate the allocation of the workers between the formal and
informal sectors and the different rules of wage formation in both sectors cannot
be ignored in order to understand the dynamics of inequality in the context of
the developing economies.
6 Conclusions
Since 2004, the Uruguayan labor market has experienced a process of formaliza-
tion—understood as an increase in the number of employees who contribute to
social security, and the related change in the premium for formality. On the other
hand, from 2007 on, all inequality indicators exhibited a significant decrease. This
article attempted to link these phenomena using microeconometric decomposi-
tions to understand wage inequality dynamics.
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The aggregated decomposition indicates that the decline in inequality between
2001 and 2013 is mainly explained by the return effect, with the composition ef-
fect reflecting a positive variation in wages which was homogeneous across the
distribution. The detailed decomposition indicates that the most significant ef-
fects, in terms of magnitude, are the ones related to formalization and education.
The relative homogeneity of the composition effect at the aggregate level is the
result of two processes with opposite effects that tend to neutralize each other.
The increase in the quantity of formal workers induces an increase in wages in
the lower percentiles of the distribution—contributing to lower inequality—while
the increase in workers’ educational attainment leads to higher wages in the
upper part of the distribution, with an unequalizing effect. These two effects tend
to cancel out and result in a non-relevant composition effect at the aggregate
level.
Regarding returns, both formalization and the level of education have equalizing
effects. The change in the formality premium has an upward impact on wages at
the bottom of the distribution. As for returns to education, they have a positive
impact on wages at the bottom of the distribution, but the effect becomes nega-
tive in the higher part.
Unlike most of the previous literature, our results highlight the importance of
the formalization process that took place in the Uruguayan labor market as a key
factor in understanding the decrease in earning inequality over the period being
analyzed. While informality cannot be claimed to be exogenous, its effect should
be interpreted as reflecting that of labor market institutions. The regulatory
framework within which labor relations develop in the formal economy—e.g.,
mechanisms to determine wages, regulations of minimum wages, social security
benefits, etc.—highly determines the degree of wage inequality in the Uruguayan
labor market.
Endnotes
1In order to maintain consistency in the time series, only urban areas with at
least 5000 inhabitants are considered—i.e. we exclude rural areas and smaller
urban areas that only appear in the household surveys starting in 2006. This
sample accounts for around 85 % of the total population of Uruguay. The
analysis of informality is conducted as of 2001, which corresponds to the first
year in which the survey asks a specific question about contributions to social
security.
2Results from the RIF regressions estimations are available under request. Summary
statistics from our data are included in Table 6
3The excluded variable is the agriculture and mining sector.
4Detailed decompositions of main inequality indexes for the whole period and for
sub-periods are included in Tables 7, 8, and 9.
5The general equilibrium effects of these changes are not clear. In particular, they
could trigger “spillover” effects in the informal sector, to the extent that the national
minimum wage or specific minimum wage of a category could serve as a signal in the
process of wage determination in informal conditions.
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Appendix




Since 2006 wages have been set in the framework of mandatory collective bargaining.
This institution was not operating since 1992. Tripartite negotiations about wage levels
and changes were set at the sector level, with the participation of representatives of
employers, workers and the government, and basically covered all formal workers in
the economy. These changes affect wage formation in the formal sector.
Minimum wage By the beginning of the twenty-first century the minimum wage had completely lost
its role as a reference price in the labor market. This was the result of a strategy to
avoid deteriorating public accounts, as various public social benefits were indexed
to the minimum wage. In 2004, a law was passed to finish that indexation, and the
minimum wage started to increase significantly.
Tax reform A tax reform was implemented in 2007, including the granting of tax
incentives—through the reduction of corporate income taxes—for productive
investment with formal job creation. An impact evaluation of these interventions
revealed that the promotion of investment was associated with an increase—between
10 and 35 % depending on the estimation—in formal employment (Llambí et al. 2014).
In turn, the reform included changes in the marginal income taxes, generating a more
progressive tax system.
National Health System The creation of the National Health System in 2008 extended health coverage
to the family of formal workers—an extension that was financed by increasing
the social contribution for health insurance. An impact evaluation of this reform
finds that the share of individuals with registered employment increased by 1.6
percentage points, which represents a 5 % increase in formal employment (see
Bérgolo and Cruces 2014).
Conditional cash
transfer programs
Conditional cash transfer programs may alter the incentives to engage in the formal
sector. In order to be eligible and remain in the program, individuals had to receive
an income below a given threshold—and this income was computed as the formal
income reported in social security records. For instance, Amarante et al. (2011) find
that PANES, a non-contributory transfer program targeting Uruguayan households
with children in 2006 and 2007, reduced male formality and labor income. Similarly,
Bérgolo and Cruces (2014) find that the new Family Allowance program, a non-
contributory transfer of the same nature as PANES and implemented in 2008,
decreased formal employment for adults in eligible households by between 18
and 30 %.























2002 31 % 91 % 65 % 69 % 44 % 25 % 25 %
2004 36 % 94 % 69 % 73 % 47 % 21 % 26 %
2006 28 % 94 % 70 % 59 % 44 % 18 % 32 %
2008 25 % 96 % 70 % 55 % 43 % 12 % 38 %
2010 23 % 97 % 70 % 53 % 43 % 10 % 42 %
2012 17 % 95 % 67 % 53 % 39 % 10 % 45 %
2013 15 % 97 % 66 % 50 % 37 % 9 % 48 %
Source: own estimations based on household surveys
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Informality (total labor force) 31.4 % 28.1 % 15.0 %
Male participation in labor force 56.8 % 55.3 % 54.5 %
Regional distribution of labor force (% in Montevideo) 53.1 % 49.4 % 49.8 %
Educational attainment
Primary complete or incomplete 29.0 % 25.5 % 19.7 %
Secondary incomplete 31.6 % 32.3 % 34.4 %
Secondary complete 21.3 % 21.3 % 21.2 %
Post-secondary incomplete 7.4 % 11.6 % 12.2 %
Post-secondary complete 10.7 % 9.4 % 13.0 %
Age
Between 13 and 17 1.7 % 1.6 % 1.0 %
Between 18 and 24 13.7 % 12.0 % 12.7 %
Between 25 and 34 22.6 % 23.2 % 24.5 %
Between 35 and 44 24.5 % 23.1 % 23.8 %
Between 45 and 60 30.3 % 32.0 % 30.2 %
More than 60 7.2 % 8.0 % 7.8 %
Public employee 16.6 % 16.5 % 15.5 %
Sector activity
Livestock, agriculture, and mining 4.3 % 4.9 % 4.1 %
Manufacturing industry 14.5 % 14.4 % 12.5 %
Electricity, gas, and water 1.0 % 1.1 % 1.3 %
Construction 8.1 % 6.6 % 8.2 %
Shops, restaurants, and hotels 22.4 % 23.4 % 22.5 %
Transport and communications 6.2 % 5.7 % 7.4 %
Business services 9.0 % 8.0 % 10.0 %
Community, personal, and social services 34.5 % 36.0 % 34.0 %
Source: own estimations based on household surveys
Table 5 Wage inequality. 2000–2013
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2013
Gini 0.401 0.412 0.416 0.423 0.401 0.39 0.356 0.351
Theil 0.295 0.313 0.32 0.332 0.294 0.272 0.223 0.22
Source: own estimations based on household survey
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Table 8 Detailed decomposition of main inequality indexes. 2001–2006
90–10 90–50 50–10 Gini 90–10 90–50 50–10 Gini
Detailed return effects
Formality −0.310 −0.062 −0.249 −0.012 −392 % −180 % −552 % −97 %
Education −0.141 −0.065 −0.076 −0.019 −178 % −189 % −170 % −149 %
Age 0.022 −0.011 0.033 −0.002 28 % −32 % 74 % −18 %
Occupational category 0.022 −0.010 0.032 −0.003 27 % −30 % 71 % −24 %
Industry 0.267 −0.007 0.274 0.009 337 % −19 % 608 % 75 %
Marital status −0.023 −0.053 0.029 −0.004 −29 % −154 % 65 % −29 %
Sex 0.004 0.023 −0.019 0.007 4 % 66 % −43 % 59 %
Region 0.026 0.014 0.012 0.006 33 % 41 % 26 % 45 %
Constant 0.185 0.187 −0.002 0.024 234 % 548 % −4 % 193 %
Total return effect 0.051 0.017 0.034 0.007 64 % 50 % 76 % 56 %
Detailed composition effects
Formality −0.017 −0.005 −0.011 −0.002 −21 % −16 % −25 % −20 %
Education 0.044 0.030 0.014 0.009 55 % 88 % 31 % 69 %
Age 0.006 0.004 0.002 0.001 8 % 12 % 5 % 11 %
Occupational category 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 % 0 % 0 % 1 %
Industry −0.009 −0.010 0.001 −0.002 −11 % −30 % 2 % −19 %
Marital status −0.001 −0.001 0.000 0.000 −1 % −2 % 0 % −1 %
Sex 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 % −1 % 0 % −1 %
Region 0.005 0.000 0.005 0.001 6 % −1 % 11 % 5 %
Total composition effect 0.028 0.017 0.011 0.006 36 % 50 % 24 % 44 %
Total change 0.079 0.034 0.045 0.013 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 %
Source: own estimations based on household surveys
Table 7 Detailed decomposition of main inequality indexes. 2001–2013
90–10 90–50 50–10 Gini 90–10 90–50 50–10 Gini
Detailed return effects
Formality −0.506 −0.040 −0.466 −0.035 392 % 26 % −1664 % 56 %
Education −0.228 −0.119 −0.109 −0.043 176 % 76 % −390 % 69 %
Age 0.031 −0.010 0.041 0.002 −24 % 6 % 146 % −4 %
Occupational category 0.002 −0.012 0.014 −0.002 −2 % 8 % 50 % 3 %
Industry 0.217 0.076 0.141 0.017 −168 % −48 % 505 % −28 %
Marital status −0.045 −0.069 0.024 −0.013 35 % 44 % 86 % 21 %
Sex −0.041 −0.028 −0.013 −0.006 32 % 18 % −47 % 9 %
Region 0.061 0.009 0.052 0.007 −47 % −5 % 186 % −12 %
Constant 0.380 0.036 0.344 0.010 −294 % −23 % 1228 % −15 %
Total return effect −0.129 −0.157 0.028 −0.062 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 %
Detailed composition effects
Formality −0.099 −0.03 −0.067 −0.019 1420 % −104 % 173 % 187 %
Education 0.091 0.063 0.028 0.008 −1294 % 201 % −72 % −75 %
Age 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 −17 % 0 % −3 % 2 %
Occupational category 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001 −22 % 1 % −3 % −14 %
Industry −0.003 0.002 −0.005 0.000 50 % 5 % 13 % 0 %
Marital status 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 7 % −1 % 0 % 0 %
Sex 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 5 % −1 % 0 % 1 %
Region 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.000 −43 % −1 % −8 % −1 %
Total composition effect −0.007 0.031 −0.038 −0.010 104 % 100 % 101 % 100 %
Source: own estimations based on household surveys
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